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TRUMP, TRUST, AND THE FUTURE OF 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN 
Sometimes constitutions fail.  The unprecedented election of Donald 
Trump, a populist insurgent1 who lacks the prior political experience or mil-
itary service of all presidents before him, is such a sharp break in American 
historical experience that it raises questions as to whether something is 
deeply amiss with the constitutional order.2 
Constitutional failure is not uncommon.3  A path-breaking global study 
of national constitutions shows that on average, they last only nineteen years.4  
The U.S. Constitution is an uncommon outlier and, as such, is accounted by 
many a long-running success story.5  But could a bell be tolling for American 
constitutionalism? 
In this Essay, I assess the meaning of Trump’s shocking rise for the fu-
ture of our constitutional order.6  The shock, of course, was not the election 
of a Republican president.  There have been many Republican presidents 
since Lincoln, each making their own distinctive contribution to the Ameri-
can tradition.  Yet, there are good reasons to think this time around is differ-
ent.7  The efficacy and, perhaps, stability of our constitutional order are in 
question, and we should try to understand why. 
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 1.  On contemporary populism, see generally JOHN B. JUDIS, THE POPULIST EXPLOSION: HOW 
THE GREAT RECESSION TRANSFORMED AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN POLITICS (2016). 
 2.  Many longstanding observers of American politics and history have had this reaction.  See, 
e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, When the President Is Ignorant of His Own Ignorance, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/opinion/when-the-president-is-ignorant-of-his-
own-ignorance; James Fallows, Despair and Hope in the Age of Trump, ATLANTIC (Jan.–Feb. 2017) 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/01/despair-and-hope-in-the-age-of-
trump/508799/. 
 3.  See generally ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF 
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (2009).  See id. at 1 (specifying the failure rate of constitutions world-
wide over time). 
 4.  Id. at 2. 
 5.  Id. at 65. 
 6.  For an insightful analysis by a political scientist of Trump’s surprising win, see Gary C. 
Jacobson, The Triumph of Polarized Partisanship in 2016: Donald Trump’s Improbable Victory, 
132 POL. SCI. Q. 9 (2017). 
 7.  See infra Part I. 
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In particular, we should consider the possibility that Trump’s success is 
the product of longstanding trends that show the Constitution to be more cri-
sis-prone than many would like to admit.8  These crises are not akin to Bruce 
Ackerman’s transformational moments and are not produced by social move-
ments seeking to reform the Constitution from the outside.9  Rather, they are 
internal to the constitutional order, created by the reality that an obdurate 
Constitution has long placed political elites in the difficult position of infor-
mally adapting it to the increased responsibilities placed on the national state.  
To understand this process of informal constitutional change,10 we should 
keep in view several moving parts—the structure of state institutions, politi-
cal parties trying to govern in a polarized environment, and the political trust 
required to keep the rickety train of government on track.11 
Given this perspective, I provide three takes on Trump and the future of 
the constitutional order.  Part I argues that Trump’s victory was enabled by 
the long-term decline in political trust.  The entire presidential selection pro-
cess, from the beginning of Trump’s candidacy to the November election was 
saturated by persistent distrust of all politicians, public officials, and govern-
ment institutions.12  This permissive context facilitated the rapid rise of can-
didate Trump, who presented himself as the savior who would “blow up” the 
system and solve the dysfunctional situation in Washington.13  In considering 
the future of the constitutional order, it is important to understand that no 
matter whether President Trump is reelected or (possibly) impeached, the 
problems of distrust and dysfunctional government will remain front and cen-
ter.14 
Part II contends that the challenge Trump presents cannot be remedied 
by returning to the verities of the Constitution because the Constitution is the 
problem.15  I critique the view that the Constitution’s checks and balances 
                                                          
 8.  This was an early concern of mine.  See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 194–201 (1996). 
 9.  See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014) 
(arguing the Constitution has been transformed in key historical episodes including Reconstruction, 
the New Deal, and the civil rights movement); JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3 (2011). 
 10.  See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Understanding Informal Constitutional Change 2 (Tulane 
Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 16-1, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2724580. 
 11.  I took this approach in a previous work.  See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, BROKEN TRUST: 
DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 31–40 (2015). 
 12.  See infra Part I. 
 13.  Doug Sosnik, Trump Is on Track to Win Reelection, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-is-on-track-to-win-reelec-
tion/2017/10/06/91cd2af0-aa15-11e7-850e-2bdd1236be5d_story.html?utm_term=.3e50afc43dd8. 
 14.  See GRIFFIN, supra note 11, at 76–77. 
 15.  For works developing this theme in different ways, see generally GRIFFIN, supra note 11; 
WILLIAM G. HOWELL & TERRY M. MOE, RELIC: HOW OUR CONSTITUTION UNDERMINES 
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will be sufficient to steer the Trump Administration within safe boundaries.  
Instead, we should face the music and acknowledge that the dysfunctional 
operation of the contemporary constitutional order made Trump’s rise possi-
ble in the first place.  The reality is that our governing order, weakened by a 
systemic loss of trust, is increasingly unable to reproduce those conditions 
that contribute to its maintenance and success.16  This means that however 
the United States eventually moves on from Trump’s presidency, what has 
been called the “Trump Effect”17 likely will persist. 
In Part III, I discuss to what extent the Trump presidency is consistent 
with political regime theory, particularly the highly influential theory of “po-
litical time” put forward by Stephen Skowronek.18  Skowronek’s theory de-
pends on the recurrence of “reconstructive” presidencies that create new pos-
sibilities for the national agenda.19  I argue that the dysfunction at the heart 
of our constitutional order today has made those sorts of presidencies diffi-
cult, if not impossible.  The last three presidencies of Bush, Obama, and now 
Trump, suggest strongly that it is this constitutional dysfunction that must be 
addressed before American politics and policy can move forward in a pro-
ductive direction. 
I.  IN TRUMP WE TRUST? 
There is nothing new in electing a Republican president.  But Donald 
Trump is something new, different from not only previous Republican pres-
idents, but from all prior presidents.  Trump has no experience as a politician, 
public official, or in the formation of public policy.  Trump is (and will re-
main throughout his presidency, absent a divestiture of his ownership of the 
Trump Organization)20 a real estate developer and former reality show host 
who learned how to brand his name worldwide.21  In order to run as a com-
petitive candidate, he had to execute what was plausibly described as a hostile 
                                                          
EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT (2016); SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S FIFTY-ONE 
CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE (2012).  
 16.  See GRIFFIN, supra note 11, at 31. 
 17.  Dan Balz, The Trump Effect Is in Full Flower, and No One Is Immune, WASH. POST (Jan. 
31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-trump-effect-is-in-full-flower-and-no-
one-is-immune/2017/01/31/d0364318-e7d2-11e6-b82f-687d6e6a3e7c_story.html. 
 18.  See generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP 
FROM JOHN ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON 30 (1993). 
 19.  Id. at 36–39. 
 20.  There is no effective separation between Trump and his business.  See Susanne Craig & 
Eric Lipton, Trust Records Show Trump Is Still Closely Tied to His Empire, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/us/politics/donald-trump-business.html. 
 21.  For a useful review of Trump’s career in relation to his presidential management style, see 
Michael Kruse, ‘He’s a Performance Artist Pretending to be a Great Manager’, POLITICO (Feb. 28, 
2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/02/hes-a-performance-artist-pretending-to-
be-a-great-manager-214836. 
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takeover of the Republican Party.22  As the venerable British magazine The 
Economist described in the election’s aftermath, “America has voted not for 
a change of party so much as a change of regime.  Mr. Trump was carried to 
office on a tide of popular rage.”23 
How should we understand the “Trump Effect”24 in relation to the Con-
stitution?  I suggest we first require a methodology that helps us understand 
the process of informal constitutional change; for that we need to introduce 
the concept of a constitutional order.  It is commonplace among scholars that 
to understand how the Constitution operates today in a practical sense, we 
should take account of norms, practices, and institutions that go beyond its 
spare text.25  The concept of a constitutional order is a useful way of summa-
rizing the reality that to be effective as a supreme law, the Constitution must 
be implemented and enforced by institutions.  Some of these institutions 
might be reasonably regarded as “formal” because they are created by the 
text, such as three branches of government.  Others are informal such as po-
litical parties.  But all of these institutions, formal or informal, have mediated 
constitutional meaning over the course of American history. 
Talking about constitutional order is a useful heuristic tool that enables 
us to focus properly on how the Constitution changes informally in different 
historical eras.  My version of this concept, which might be called “constitu-
tional change as state building,”26 features two particular claims.  First, we 
should attend to how the structure of and resources available to these institu-
tions influence how the Constitution is enforced over time.27  Second, we 
should assess whether constitutional orders succeed at reproducing them-
selves across time.28  These claims are related because the degree of support 
institutions can command from the public is critical to whether they can re-
produce themselves successfully.29  It is here that the empirical literature on 
political trust is especially relevant.30 
                                                          
 22.  See, e.g., Dan Balz, Donald Trump, America’s First Independent President, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/donald-trump-americas-first-independ-
ent-president/2016/11/19/b09e1cc6-ade2-11e6-8b45-f8e493f06fcd_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-top-
table-main_sundaytake523pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.07782c679fac. 
 23.  America’s New President: The Trump Era, ECONOMIST (Nov. 12, 2016), http://www.econ-
omist.com/news/leaders/21709951-his-victory-threatens-old-certainties-about-america-and-its-
role-world-what-will-take. 
 24.  Balz, supra note 17. 
 25.  See Griffin, supra note 10, at 1 n.3.  
 26.  Id. at 18. 
 27.  I advanced this idea for the case of war powers previously.  See generally STEPHEN M. 
GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION (2013). 
 28.  GRIFFIN, supra note 11, at 31–40. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  See generally MARC J. HETHERINGTON, WHY TRUST MATTERS: DECLINING POLITICAL 
TRUST AND THE DEMISE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM (2005); MARC J. HETHERINGTON & THOMAS 
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Trump did not run a campaign based on reproducing an existing order.  
In fact, by frontally challenging so many assumptions about what constitutes 
regular order in politics, Trump was arguably putting in question the contem-
porary constitutional order itself.  As well described by one commentator, 
“Trump is a transgressive personality,”31 and it could be said as well that his 
campaign transgressed many fundamental political rules of the game.  With-
out taking on for the moment the question of whether these are violations of 
constitutional norms, consider his statements (1) that the presidential election 
was rigged; (2) that he would not necessarily abide by the result; (3) that he 
would prosecute his opponent Hillary Clinton; (4) that he suggested all of his 
opponents were corrupt; (5) denying allegations of Russian hacking of the 
Democratic Party without evidence; and (6) claiming after the election that 
millions of illegal immigrants cast votes for Hillary Clinton.32 
Trump’s transgressive behavior did not slacken after he arrived in 
Washington.33  In fact, writing this Essay I found it impossible to keep up.34  
His inauguration speech contended that over the decades, the Washington 
elite stole the wealth of the country for its own personal benefit.35  Following 
the inauguration, Trump again claimed that millions of illegal votes were cast 
in the presidential election,36 attacked federal court judges who ruled against 
                                                          
J. RUDOLPH, WHY WASHINGTON WON’T WORK: POLARIZATION, POLITICAL TRUST, AND THE 
GOVERNING CRISIS (2015). 
 31.  Peter Wehner, Why I Cannot Fall in Line Behind Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/21/opinion/sunday/why-i-cannot-fall-in-line-behind-
trump.html. 
 32.  For (1)–(3), see Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, Is Donald Trump a Threat to Democ-
racy?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/opinion/sunday/is-don-
ald-trump-a-threat-to-democracy.html.  For (4), see Lexington: The People v. the People, 
ECONOMIST (Nov. 12, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21709919-setting-
americans-against-each-other-paved-president-elects-path-power-people-v.  For (5) see Eugene 
Kiely, Trump Misleads on Russia Hacking, FACTCHECK.ORG (July 7, 2017), 
http://www.factcheck.org/2017/07/trump-misleads-russia-hacking.  For (6), see Edward Helmore, 
Trump Claims ‘Millions Voted Illegally’ but Offers No Evidence, GUARDIAN (Nov. 28, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/27/donald-trump-scam-recount-jill-stein-hillary-
clinton.   
 33.  Perhaps his most disturbing tendency is to try to deliberately divide Americans by race.  
See, e.g., Michael Gerson, America Has a Racial Demagogue for a President, WASH. POST (Sept. 
25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/america-has-a-racial-demagogue-for-a-pres-
ident/2017/09/25/07af83da-a223-11e7-b14f-f41773cd5a14_story.html?utm_term=.1bb3de013714. 
 34.  It has been a difficult time for many Americans.  It is relevant here that the Washington 
Post’s fact checker found that in his first 232 days in office, President Trump made 1,145 false and 
misleading claims. Fact Checker, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/poli-
tics/trump-claims-database (last updated Oct. 9, 2017). 
 35.  Inaugural Address: Trump’s Full Speech, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/20/poli-
tics/trump-inaugural-address (last updated Jan. 21, 2017). 
 36.  Michael D. Shear & Emmarie Huetteman, Trump Repeats Lie About Popular Vote in Meet-
ing with Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/poli-
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his travel ban,37 and referred to the news media as “the enemy of the Ameri-
can people.”38  He accused President Obama of having his phones at Trump 
Tower wiretapped during the election campaign,39 and he accused Susan 
Rice, President Obama’s National Security Adviser, of committing a crime—
both without any apparent evidence.40  In May, Trump threw Washington 
into turmoil—and created a serious ongoing problem for himself in terms of 
an investigation by a special prosecutor—by suddenly dismissing FBI Direc-
tor James Comey.41  At the time, Comey was in the middle of supervising an 
investigation into how Russia attempted to influence the 2016 election.42  
These statements and actions raised hard questions about Trump’s basic com-
petence to serve as president, and he admitted that the job was far more dif-
ficult than he had expected.43 
                                                          
tics/donald-trump-congress-democrats.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homep-
age&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-
news. 
 37.  Brian Bennett, Trump Attacks Federal Judges in Unusually Personal Terms, L.A. TIMES 
(Feb. 8, 2017), http://beta.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-supreme-court-20170209-
story.html. 
 38.  Kristine Phillips, ‘Greatest Threat to Democracy’: Commander of Bin Laden Raid Slams 
Trump’s Anti-Media Sentiment, WASH. POST: CHECKPOINT (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/02/23/greatest-threat-to-democracy-commander-of-bin-
laden-raid-slams-trumps-anti-media-sentiment/?utm_term=.389b487b4418. 
 39.  Michael D. Shear & Michael S. Schmidt, Trump, Offering No Evidence, Says Obama 
Tapped His Phones, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/us/poli-
tics/trump-obama-tap-phones.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-
heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news. 
 40. Maggie Haberman et al., Trump, Citing No Evidence, Suggests Susan Rice Committed 
Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/us/politics/trump-inter-
view-susan-rice.html. 
 41.  David A. Graham, Only Mueller’s Team Knows What It’s Actually Doing, ATLANTIC 
(Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/09/mueller-investigation-black-
box/538707; Michael D. Shear, F.B.I. Director James Comey Is Fired by Trump, N.Y. TIMES (May 
9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/us/politics/james-comey-fired-fbi.html.  
 42.  Maggie Haberman et al., ‘Enough Was Enough’: How Festering Anger at Comey Ended 
in His Firing, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/us/politics/how-
trump-decided-to-fire-james-comey.html; Philip Rucker et al., Inside Trump’s Anger and Impa-
tience—and His Sudden Decision to Fire Comey, WASH. POST (May 10, 2017), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/politics/how-trumps-anger-and-impatience-prompted-him-to-fire-the-fbi-direc-
tor/2017/05/10/d9642334-359c-11e7-b373-418f6849a004_story.html. 
 43.  Philip Bump, Trump Now Agrees with the Majority of Americans: He Wasn’t Ready to be 
President, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/poli-
tics/wp/2017/04/28/trump-now-agrees-with-the-majority-of-americans-he-wasnt-ready-to-be-pres-
ident/; E.J. Dionne Jr., Admit It: Trump Is Unfit to Serve, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/admit-it-trump-is-unfit-to-serve/2017/02/15/467d0bbe-
f3be-11e6-8d72-263470bf0401_story.html?utm_term=.77e7134d61a6; Michael D. Shear, ‘Unbe-
lievable Turmoil’: Trump’s First Month Leaves Washington Reeling, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/us/politics/trump-white-house.html?hp&ac-
tion=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=a-lede-package-region&re-
gion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news; Karen Tumulty, Trump’s Charge That He Was Wiretapped 
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Many longtime political observers continue to express their dismay at 
Trump’s election and his multiple transgressions of political norms, but it is 
perhaps more productive to analyze the environment that made these events 
possible in the first place.  Although Trump may be bringing something new 
to the table, he may also be simply opportunistic.  With that in mind, I suggest 
Trump’s unconventional campaign was fueled from the start by the highly 
permissive environment created by the decline of trust in government.  To be 
sure, Trump did all he could on his own to foment distrust.  As The Economist 
commented, Trump “won office by systematically undermining trust in any 
figure or institution that seemed to stand in his way.”44  Yet ultimately, he 
was more the beneficiary of distrust than its progenitor.  The ground was 
cleared well before Trump took the field, given that both President Obama 
and Hillary Clinton were widely distrusted, at least by Republicans.45 
Trust in government has been declining in the United States since the 
mid-1960s and distrust reached significant levels during the 1970s.46  Alt-
hough trust in government recovered somewhat during Reagan’s first term 
and as Bill Clinton was reelected in 1996, it never rebounded to the level 
attained before the recognition of race as a national issue, not to mention Vi-
etnam and Watergate.47  After the 1970s the noneconomic causes of persist-
ing low levels of trust are unclear, although it is worth considering that some 
scholars believe that the high levels of trust enjoyed after World War II were 
anomalous.48 
The extensive literature on the causes of low trust in government does 
not pay sufficient attention to its constitutional hazards.49  I have called at-
tention to these, arguing that low trust interferes with the ability of institu-
tions to reproduce themselves and plausibly imposes a legitimacy drain on 
the normal operations of government.50  This creates the potential for sudden, 
                                                          
Takes Presidency into New Territory, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2017), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/politics/trumps-charge-that-he-was-wiretapped-takes-presidency-into-new-terri-
tory/2017/03/05/7ce64578-01bd-11e7-ad5b-d22680e18d10_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-
main_trumpdebrief-530pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.534147df791d. 
 44.  Donald Trump’s Most Damaging Legacy May be a Lower-Trust America, ECONOMIST 
(Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21712157-fomenting-cynicism-
and-partisan-divisions-his-best-chance-surviving-his-term-donald. 
 45.  Michael Barbaro, Americans Don’t Trust Her. But Why?, N.Y. TIMES: THE RUN-UP (Aug. 
16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/16/podcasts/hillary-clinton-trust.html. 
 46.  GRIFFIN, supra note 11, at 76–100. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 84. 
 49.  For one recent useful review of the evidence, see Bill Bishop, Americans Have Lost Faith 
in Institutions.  That’s Not Because of Trump or ‘Fake News’, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/03/03/americans-have-lost-faith-in-in-
stitutions-thats-not-because-of-trump-or-fake-news/?hpid=hp_no-name_opinion-card-
e%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.320704ca9131. 
 50.  GRIFFIN, supra note 11, at 31–40. 
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sharp breaks from traditional constitutional norms.  The early 1990s, for ex-
ample, was a period of very low trust, and the subsequent increase in politi-
cization was widely noticed.51  We could ask why someone like Trump did 
not appear before, but in fact, populist outsider Ross Perot did make a good 
run at the presidency in 1992 (eventually winning nineteen percent of the 
popular vote) despite having no prior experience in politics and a personality 
unsuited for elective office.52  John Judis argues that Perot represented a “rad-
ical middle” of Americans who did not describe themselves as liberal or con-
servative and believed they had not benefited from global free trade or the 
neoliberal agenda.53  At least part of this diagnosis should have a familiar 
ring.54 
Recent research on political trust contrasts the situation prevailing after 
9/11 with the experience of the Obama Administration.  Marc Hetherington 
and Thomas Rudolph argue that one reason trust continued to be high for a 
time after 9/11 was that “politics was consumed by foreign affairs and war.”55  
Although they may distrust government as a general matter, Americans re-
spect, and indeed trust, particular government institutions such as the mili-
tary.56  Hetherington and Rudolph contend that when government focuses on 
a problem of foreign affairs Americans agree on and employs the military 
effectively, trust is maintained.57  But the situation is different when domestic 
issues are in the foreground, such as after the 2008 financial crisis.  With no 
political consensus on solutions, trust plummeted and “spawned a virulently 
antigovernment political movement”—the Tea Party.58  The nature of this 
movement contributed to a growing crisis of governance.59 
Hetherington and Rudolph are careful to say there is no strong evidence 
that Americans are polarized based on ideology or policy.60  Rather, the key 
phenomenon is the polarization of trust by party.61  For example, Republicans 
trust government “quite a lot when one of their own occupies the White 
                                                          
 51.  See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS 31–
43 (2012) (discussing the rise of Newt Gingrich leading to Republican takeover of Congress in 
1994). 
 52.  JUDIS, supra note 1, at 46–51. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  For a similar analysis, see GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS 
CONSTITUTION: WHY ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC 272 (2017). 
 55.  HETHERINGTON & RUDOLPH, supra note 30, at 7. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 8. 
 59.  Id.  
 60.  Id. at 16–21.  It should be said that there is considerable disagreement on this issue among 
political scientists.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 8–11. 
 2017]   TRUMP, TRUST, AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 169 
 
House.  What Republicans do not trust is government headed by Demo-
crats.”62  Hetherington and Rudolph argue that, in the past, Democrats who 
trusted government, even during Republican administrations, provided the 
political consensus necessary (they term it “ideological sacrifice”) for those 
administrations to succeed in moving the machinery of government to make 
important policy changes.63  But trust among Democrats declined signifi-
cantly during George W. Bush’s second term, helping to explain why Bush 
made little headway on domestic policy.64  When the Obama Administration 
came into office, the situation reversed and in dramatic fashion.65  Republi-
cans never trusted President Obama, and his running room to advance na-
tional policy after Democrats lost control of Congress in 2010 was accord-
ingly very limited.66 
What I wish to add to this picture is the role of policy disasters in reduc-
ing trust in government.67  Political elites have made it considerably more 
difficult to reverse the decline in trust by making some drastic mistakes.  Con-
sider the role of the budget deficit in relation to Perot’s unexpected appeal in 
1992.68  I suggest this became one of Perot’s main issues because both parties 
told the American people the issue was of overriding importance—then failed 
to deliver.  Let us call this “both-party failure.”  Instances of both-party fail-
ure cast doubt on the efficacy of the system.  The phenomenon of both-party 
failure was key to the rise of the immigration issue in the 2016 election, a 
point I develop in Part II.  Close attention to Hetherington and Rudolph’s 
analysis shows the relevance of more recent policy disasters.69  The Iraq War 
and the 2008 financial crisis were long over by the time Trump declared his 
candidacy, but they nonetheless were part of the deep background that made 
it possible.70  These highly salient failures undermined the claims to expertise 
of both party and technocratic elites.  These elites were no longer trusted by 
the public. 
The Iraq War discredited everyone connected with it and contributed to 
both Democratic disenchantment with the Bush presidency and Trump’s abil-
ity to challenge party elites.71  The financial crisis arguably discredited both 
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parties yet again, but the government’s response was seized on by conserva-
tive elements in the Republican Party to discredit President Obama.  After 
Obama unexpectedly (from the point of view of conservatives) won reelec-
tion, the policy process became stalemated, further undermining trust in both 
parties.  On the Republican side, the rank and file were disappointed with the 
failure to unwind Obama’s executive initiatives.  On the Democratic side, the 
rank and file were just disappointed—period.  So the groundwork was laid 
for the emergence of outsiders.  But it is worth emphasizing that this hap-
pened because both parties were seen to fail the American people. 
Another aspect of the run-up to the Trump candidacy that deserves men-
tion is that all of these policy disasters could be plausibly understood as the 
failures of elites.  There was never any groundswell of broad public support 
for the Iraq War and certainly none for the measures taken to alleviate the 
financial crisis.72  Both of these disasters were technocratic elite-driven poli-
cymaking at its finest, which is to say they had little to do with any real idea 
of democracy.  This produced a populist insurgency in both parties: a “left” 
version represented by Senator Bernie Sanders, and a “right” version repre-
sented by Donald Trump.73 
Thus, the 2016 presidential election took place within a pervasive low-
trust environment.74  As Americans approached the polls, many of them ex-
pressed a loss of faith in the democratic process.75  Why?  Perhaps because 
from the point of view of the average citizen, we have had three “change” 
elections since 2000 after which, from the perspective of a significant ele-
ment of both left and right opinion, there was no change at all.76  This even-
tually produced a true populist insurgency.77  These voters want to “blow up” 
                                                          
 72.  Hetherington & Rudolph, supra note 30, at 131, 151. 
 73.  JUDIS, supra note 1. 
 74.  In addition to the survey evidence, this is well illustrated by Arlie Russell Hochschild’s 
study of Republican Tea Party members in Louisiana.  See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, 
STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND: ANGER AND MOURNING ON THE AMERICAN RIGHT 48 (2016). 
 75.  Nathaniel Persily & Jon Cohen, Americans Are Losing Faith in Democracy—and in Each 
Other, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/americans-are-los-
ing-faith-in-democracy—and-in-each-other/2016/10/14/b35234ea-90c6-11e6-9c52-
0b10449e33c4_story.html?hpid=hp_no-name_opinion-card-f%3Ahomep-
age%2Fstory&utm_term=.e7793035a7e1. 
 76.  Glenn Thrush, 10 Crucial Decisions That Reshaped America, POLITICO (Dec. 9, 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/2016-presidential-election-10-moments-trump-
clinton-214508 (calling the 2016 election the “third straight change election”). 
 77.  On the notion of populism as a rejection of both political parties, see Sosnik, supra note 
13. 
 2017]   TRUMP, TRUST, AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 171 
 
our system of government or, at least, the way it typically works in Washing-
ton.78  The election outcome produced disbelief.  As The Economist re-
marked, “Half of America can scarcely believe the other half has chosen Mr. 
Trump.”79 
II.  THE CONSTITUTION AS PROBLEM AND SOLUTION 
I noted in Part I that it is now commonplace for scholars to see the Con-
stitution as consisting of much more than the actual text.  But if we agree that 
the Constitution in some sense includes the norms, practices, and institutions 
that implement it, crucial consequences follow for how we analyze the role 
of the Constitution in relation to the Trump phenomenon.  In particular, we 
should avoid what I will call “externalism,” the view that whatever the sig-
nificance of Trump’s victory and presidency, it is somehow happening in a 
sphere of action external to the “normal” operation of the Constitution.  Ra-
ther, if we are indeed governed by a Constitution that has both formal and 
informal structures, that is, what I have called a constitutional order, then we 
have to take more seriously the possibility that Trump and Trumpism are in-
ternal to American constitutional development.  Trump himself may in time 
be “solved” by some constitutional process (such as impeachment), but that 
would not change the reality that he was produced by the constitutional order 
itself. 
Consider in this light the perspective that might be called “constitutional 
fundamentalism.”  Fundamentalism is a form of externalism, and it will likely 
be a leading way of analyzing the constitutional meaning of the Trump pres-
idency.  I say this with some confidence because fundamentalism dominated 
the commentary with respect to the use of executive power during the Bush 
and Obama presidencies.80  Fundamentalist critics typically argued that these 
presidents abused their power, violated basic rights, and departed from tradi-
tional legal norms.  Invigorating the system of checks and balances was usu-
ally presented as the solution to executive overreaching.  Such themes ought 
to sound familiar in light of Trump’s conflict with the federal judiciary over 
his ill-conceived travel ban.81 
I offer an alternative perspective.  Initially, if we observe multiple pres-
idents with very different political orientations misbehaving, it is likely that 
their actions are reflective, rather than subversive, of the existing constitu-
tional order.  All presidents exercise their power within an institutional order.  
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That order has been shaped, through both formal and informal legal means, 
over the course of American history.  Perhaps this seems straightforward, yet 
it calls into question the soundness of the baseline to which fundamentalists 
implicitly appeal.  To the extent the fundamentalist critique of executive 
power is rooted ultimately in an appeal to the authority of the checks and 
balances established in the eighteenth century, it is misguided.  Such a cri-
tique assumes that we can call into being the eighteenth-century constitu-
tional (institutional) order, yet this is no more possible than it is possible (or 
desirable) to time-jump back to the eighteenth century. 
Further, there is a relevant sense in which fundamental systems, such as 
checks and balances themselves, produced the concentrated populist rage that 
fueled Trump’s candidacy.  Here I have in mind especially the policy logjam 
in Congress that developed during Obama’s second term,82 particularly with 
respect to immigration reform.  In a major speech in November 2014, Presi-
dent Obama announced significant executive actions on immigration that be-
came a source of partisan contention and litigation.83  Yet in the speech, 
Obama balanced his unilateral actions against an account of a dysfunctional 
legislative process, which no one disputed.84  In the wake of the 2012 reelec-
tion of President Obama, the Senate in June 2013 passed a bipartisan com-
prehensive immigration reform with a vote of 68-32.  As Obama recounted, 
it then fell to Speaker John Boehner and the House leadership to take action.85  
Not only did they fail to take action, they refused to allow the measure to 
come to a vote on the House floor, although they knew it would certainly 
pass with support from both parties.86  This was a fairly historic lapse in the 
legislative process. 
As Obama described the measures he would take with respect to undoc-
umented immigrants, he remarked, “Americans are tired of gridlock.”87  They 
most assuredly are!88  Only about six months after Obama’s speech, Donald 
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Trump came down an escalator in Trump Tower in New York City and an-
nounced his candidacy for president.89  His remarks on undocumented immi-
grants in particular struck a nerve (Mexican “rapists”).90  But given that Con-
gress had not enacted comprehensive immigration reform in 2013, Trump 
was enabled—that is, he was able to claim not only that America’s immigra-
tion situation was unacceptable and dangerous, but that Washington had done 
nothing.  Surely Trump and Obama were both correct in observing that Con-
gress had become dysfunctional.  Because of the intransigence of the most 
conservative members in the House of Representatives, it had punted on one 
of the most crucial policy questions facing the country. 
As I discussed in Part I, Ross Perot’s 1992 presidential run suggests a 
useful rule of thumb.  When both parties tell the American people (perhaps 
for different reasons) that a policy problem must be solved, but then fail con-
spicuously to address it, this creates an unstable situation that allows relative 
outsiders to enter the political arena.  The House’s failure to even hold a vote 
on the key issue of immigration reform created just this sort of opportunity.  
But such a political failure can also be a problem for the constitutional order.  
The inexperience of outsider candidates and the subsequent lack of effective 
action may well further increase distrust. 
The problem with constitutional fundamentalism is that it tends to sep-
arate Trump from the Constitution, as if he were an external force to be caged 
by the system of checks and balances.  This ignores the possibility that Trump 
might in some sense be a product of a dysfunctional (should we say “fail-
ing”?) constitutional order.  Certainly some commentators may believe the 
system of checks and balances is working.  My point is that this fails to fore-
ground the far more urgent question of how Trump got into the White House 
in the first place. 
I believe that, in the grip of externalism and fundamentalism, scholars 
tend to resist the notion that our constitutional order is in trouble and, indeed, 
might require an overhaul.  Consider that many leading scholars are resistant 
to thinking about our current circumstances as possibly leading to a “consti-
tutional crisis.”91  But constitutional crises are historical events, and I hope 
we can agree that they are best studied as history, that is, taking into consid-
eration the self-conscious understanding of the participants.  I think it sensi-
bly follows that it is best to proceed inductively by examining widely agreed-
on instances of constitutional crises in American history and to build a theory 
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about what they are and why they occur.  Nonetheless, this intuitive approach 
puts me at odds methodologically with some scholars who would rather pro-
ceed deductively from first premises.92  They put forward criteria to identify 
constitutional crises in the past without asking what events were regarded as 
crises at the time.  Speaking generally, I believe this leads scholars to mis-
takenly ignore several instances in the twentieth century (including Wa-
tergate and Iran-contra) that not only should be treated as constitutional cri-
ses, but that provide important clues about the nature of, and the problems 
with, the contemporary constitutional order. 
In an earlier work, I argued that American constitutional crises typically 
involve the creation of a state of fundamental uncertainty.93  Surely political 
stability is a key goal of any constitution, and it is certainly a quality at-
tributed to the U.S. Constitution.  In constitutional crises, however, the Con-
stitution’s normal reassuring polarity reverses and unexpectedly injects in-
stability into daily politics.  The Constitution’s secure framework for politics 
becomes increasingly shaky.  Now, in such a situation we might believe that 
it is the officials running the institutions that are the problem, not the Consti-
tution itself.  But we need to ask ourselves what the Constitution is.  It is this 
question that lies at the heart of many conundrums in constitutional theory, 
including how to understand constitutional crises.  If the Constitution is im-
plemented or enforced through institutions, that is, through a constitutional 
order, then the operation of those institutions will tend to determine what the 
Constitution is in a practical sense.  In other words, I think it is more useful 
to see constitutional crises as generated internally rather than externally.  To 
be sure, there are many other bad scenarios that might happen, constitution-
ally speaking.  The United States might be invaded, and we might only then 
discover some hidden flaw in the Constitution that prevents an effective gov-
ernment response.  But I think history shows that this is implausible. 
Now consider the current situation.  As I have already argued, one re-
spectable path for analysis is that Trump himself—the fact that he was able 
to seize control of the Republican Party and got into the White House—is the 
measure of the crisis.94  Trump is arguably the product of a failing constitu-
tional order, one riven by a profound lack of trust in government.  These 
circumstances have given us a “chaos president,” to borrow Jeb Bush’s 
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phrase.95  Presumably, little good can come of this.  But the initial response 
of many constitutional scholars is an unhelpful externalism.  They portray 
Trump as a bumper car, so to speak, bouncing off a black box called the 
Constitution.  According to constitutional fundamentalism, checks and bal-
ances will save the day.96  Yet the question still lingers: where did Trump 
come from in the first place? 
In earlier work, I also proposed that it is appropriate to use the word 
“crisis” in a situation in which the apparently normal operation of the consti-
tutional system indicates “that something is fundamentally wrong with the 
way the system is operating as a whole.”97  I pointed to the decline of trust in 
government, referencing Ross Perot’s surprising showing in the 1992 elec-
tion, saying: “The emergence of a significant group of citizens who are pro-
foundly alienated from politics and government and feel powerless to affect 
ostensibly democratic institutions is the most disturbing aspect of the con-
temporary constitutional system.”98  As you may be able to tell, I am feeling 
pretty good about this twenty-year-old analysis in light of the populist insur-
gency hammering both political parties today.99  It suggests constitutional 
crises can be the product of long-smoldering chains of dysfunction. 
But suppose, in the end, most of Trump’s policy initiatives are frustrated 
by ordinary checks and balances.  Would we be justified in concluding that 
the Constitution still works as advertised?  Not in the current situation.  Hav-
ing Trump frustrated by standard-issue checks, along with the newer Wash-
ington gridlock that has stood in the way of all recent presidents, reproduces 
the highly dangerous and volatile set of circumstances that produced him in 
the first place.100  However extreme Trump might seem, there is always some-
thing worse on the political horizon.  Just as a policy logjam on issues such 
as immigration led to Trump’s rise, the frustration of continuous policy de-
feats could well drive Republican voters to even more extreme measures.  To 
avoid this downward spiral, we need to offer voters in both parties an option 
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they do not currently have at present—fundamental political and constitu-
tional reform.  The emphasis of responsible political elites should be on re-
balancing the constitutional order rather than preserving it.  That means con-
stitutional change, whether formal or informal, should be on everyone’s 
agenda.101 
III.  IN POLITICAL TIME OR A DYSFUNCTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER? 
Since Trump’s unexpected victory, scholars have been discussing how 
to place him in what Stephen Skowronek taught us to call “political time.”102  
Political time is how presidents relate to each other across American his-
tory.103  So, for example, presidents such as Lincoln and FDR are “recon-
structive” in that they used their substantial majorities to lead the Nation into 
fundamentally new policy territory.104  Other presidents are their affiliates, 
such as Ulysses Grant and Harry Truman, respectively.105  There are other 
categories—“preemptive” presidents like Nixon who act against governing 
regimes,106 and “disjunctive” presidents like Carter who signal their end107—
but my focus here is on the key role of reconstructive presidents. 
It is clear that without at least the potential of reconstructive presiden-
cies, whether we are still in what Skowronek calls “the circuit of political 
time”108 would be brought into serious question.  Skowronek’s account seems 
to suggest there cannot be an endless succession of affiliated or preemptive 
presidencies because party-political governing coalitions do not last for-
ever.109  But from the standpoint of 2017, who was the last reconstructive 
president?  Following Skowronek’s lead, everyone assumes it was Ronald 
Reagan, who certainly set the template for the contemporary conservative 
Republican Party.110  So it is especially noteworthy that Skowronek ex-
pressed considerable doubt about Reagan’s reconstructive status in the orig-
inal presentation of his theory.111  Although there were similarities between 
Reagan and FDR, there were also significant differences, which implied to 
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Skowronek that the analytical usefulness of “political time” was coming to 
an end.112  Unlike FDR (the last reconstructive president before Reagan), 
Reagan never gained full party control of Congress.113  Democrats continued 
to hold the House and even regained control of the Senate in 1986.  The force 
of Reagan’s reconstruction was largely limited to tax and budget policy.  
Even in this realm, his “administration created a monumental governing 
problem”114 that ultimately “served less to open political possibilities in mod-
ern America than to short-circuit them.”115  This implied that the notion of 
political time was in question. 
As a possible explanation for what he calls “the waning of political 
time,”116 Skowronek noted the growing significance of entrenched institu-
tions and interest groups in Washington.117  He highlighted “a pattern of 
greater institutional resilience in the face of these [reconstructive] presidents’ 
order-shattering authority.”118  He speculated that following Reagan, we may 
be fated to endure a politics of “perpetual preemption,”119 in which each pres-
ident acquires authority by at least appearing to oppose the immediately pre-
ceding president and the reigning institutional regime.120  In what follows, I 
explore the possibility that Skowronek was right to suggest that the presidents 
who followed Reagan and his affiliate George H. W. Bush have not been able 
to reproduce (or take advantage of) the logic of political time. 
Skowronek’s model depends on the existence of a governing coalition 
dominated by one party and its ideology.  This governing coalition winds the 
clock of presidential political time.  Presidents either bring it into being dur-
ing reconstructive times, affiliate with it in favorable times, or do their level 
best to maintain or oppose it in difficult times.  But what if there is no domi-
nant governing coalition? 
After Reagan, American politics was arguably dominated by the reality 
of divided government, implying either a fundamentally divided governing 
coalition or the lack of such a coalition altogether.  Another reality of post-
Reagan America was the disappearance of the foreign and domestic policy 
context that existed when Reagan first appeared on the scene in the early 
1960s, a context that persisted almost until the end of his presidency.  With 
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respect to foreign affairs, the Cold War still structured politics as Reagan took 
office, of which he took full advantage.  On the domestic side, there is no 
doubt there was a growing impetus to reduce taxes and deregulate the econ-
omy in the 1970s.  Yet by the Clinton  and George W. Bush Administrations, 
these policy contexts had become much less compelling.  The shock of the 
9/11 attacks reset the foreign policy agenda, and the shock of the 2008 finan-
cial crisis strongly affected President Obama’s domestic policy, but not in 
directions anticipated by Reagan’s partial reconstruction. 
A key indicator that political time is less helpful in understanding our 
current situation is the predicament of Reagan’s most stalwart supporters.  
They are clearly at a loss to understand where Trump is coming from, partic-
ularly with respect to foreign policy.121  Trump’s relentless emphasis on zero-
sum nationalism and the mortal threat of immigration is alien to them.  Yet, 
Skowronek’s model does not account in any obvious way for the obsoles-
cence of the policy context that existed when Reagan took office in 1981.  
After all, the idea of a governing coalition appears to assume a persistent 
policy context that is continually addressed, whether well or badly.  Once that 
policy context disappears, one would assume a new reconstructive president 
would appear on the scene.  Yet just the opposite has occurred with respect 
to the last three presidents. 
It is also telling that Bush’s win in 2000, Obama’s in 2008, and Trump’s 
in 2016 were all understood as “change” elections—but by very different 
groups!  Although there were obviously Americans looking for a change at 
each of these elections, surely the increasingly polarized and closely divided 
state of the electorate militates against any comprehensive “reconstructive” 
political change.122  In such an environment, I suggest it is a mistake to con-
tinue to take the temperature of new presidents to see if a reconstructive 
change has occurred.123  The broader reality is that they have become extraor-
dinarily difficult or even impossible, as Skowronek originally hinted. 
We should consider an alternative understanding of what is going on 
with respect to American politics, one that points to an increasingly dysfunc-
tional constitutional order.  To employ Skowronek’s terms, it is certainly 
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plausible that Trump is a “disjunctive” president, one that presages the col-
lapse of Reagan’s coalition.124  The problem America faces, however, is that 
the Democratic Party coalition is equally disjunctive in relation to the exist-
ing order.  Both parties are disjunctive in the sense that they are increasingly 
assailed by voters with recognizably “populist” impulses who oppose the 
elites in charge in Washington. 
Because of the enormous amount of state building that has occurred in 
prior administrations, we lack the ability to generate a reconstructive presi-
dency.  Our situation is more akin to the one Skowronek hinted at in his 
“waning of political time” discussion: a series of preemptive presidencies, in 
which each party attempts to demonstrate mastery over our resilient built-
out, tenured-in state by selectively preempting policies of the prior presi-
dent.125  Certainly both Obama’s and Trump’s presidencies began this way: 
the presidents announced with great fanfare that they were by executive order 
repealing certain (often minor) policies of the preceding president. 
Yet, the real problem goes deeper.  The policy disasters that have oc-
curred in recent years, including the Iraq War and the 2008 financial crisis, 
suggest that something is deeply wrong with the way the American state is 
organized.126  An increasingly serious tension has developed between the un-
changing formal Constitution and the dominant way we have handled state 
building through a process of informal constitutional change.  It is this ten-
sion that is the source of many of our recent policy difficulties, and it is con-
tinually frustrating a succession of presidents that have sought to sponsor sig-
nificant policy change.  And this lack of meaningful policy progress has 
arguably so frustrated the American electorate that they turned to the most 
unqualified presidential candidate in history, Donald Trump. 
IV.  CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
It is entirely understandable that one prominent reaction to the Trump 
presidency is to more tightly embrace the Constitution and the values it pro-
tects.  Yet for the reasons developed in this Essay, the future of the constitu-
tional order is likely to depend on political elites growing more comfortable 
with the notion of reforming the Constitution, possibly in fundamental re-
spects.127  Failing to consider reasonable proposals for change in our present 
circumstances is the equivalent of endorsing a failed national policy process.  
                                                          
 124.  See Jack M. Balkin, Trump and Constitutional Time, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 4, 2017, 3:46 
PM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/03/trump-and-constitutional-time.html (embedding 
YouTube video, Tulane Law, Tulane Law School’s 2017 McGlinchey Lecture, YOUTUBE (Mar. 2, 
2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AgMK_SVRQHQ). 
 125.  SKOWRONEK, supra note 18, at 413, 442–46. 
 126.  See GRIFFIN, supra note 11. 
 127.  Id. 
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This may well produce presidential candidates in the future that will be more 
unexpected, unusual, and politically extreme than Trump.  Without signifi-
cant reforms, the contemporary American constitutional order is likely not 
stable.  It is that reality that needs to be addressed forthrightly. 
